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ABSTRACT 
Background. Respiratory viruses spread in humans across wide geographical areas in short 
periods of time, resulting in high levels of morbidity and mortality. We undertook a 
systematic review to assess the evidence that air, ground and sea mass transportation systems 
or hubs are associated with propagating influenza and coronaviruses. 
Methods. Healthcare databases and sources of grey literature were searched using pre-defined 
criteria between April and June 2014. Two reviewers screened all identified records against 
the protocol, undertook risk of bias assessments and extracted data using a piloted form. 
Results were analysed using a narrative synthesis. 
Results. Forty-one studies met the eligibility criteria. Risk of bias was high in the 
observational studies, moderate to high in the reviews and moderate to low in the modelling 
studies. In-flight influenza transmission was identified substantively on five flights with up to 
four confirmed and six suspected secondary cases per affected flight. Five studies highlighted 
the role of air travel in accelerating influenza spread to new areas. Influenza outbreaks aboard 
cruise ships affect 2% - 7% of passengers. Influenza transmission events have been observed 
aboard ground transport vehicles. High heterogeneity between studies and the inability to 
exclude other sources of infection means that the risk of influenza transmission from an index 
case to other passengers cannot be accurately quantified. A paucity of evidence was identified 
describing SARS-CoV and MERS-CoV transmission events associated with transportation 
systems or hubs. 
Conclusion. Air transportation appears important in accelerating and amplifying influenza 
propagation. Transmission occurs aboard aeroplanes, at the destination and possibly at 
airports. Control measures to prevent influenza transmission on cruise ships are needed to 
reduce morbidity and mortality. There is no recent evidence of sea transport accelerating 
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influenza or coronavirus spread to new areas. Further investigation is required regarding the 
roles of ground transportation systems and transport hubs in pandemic situations. 
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Epidemiological evidence has demonstrated the speed and extent to which influenza 
A(H1N1)pdm09, Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome coronavirus (SARS-CoV) and Middle 
East Respiratory Syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV) may be disseminated globally and 
cause a significant burden on human health and health systems [1, 2, 3]. International 
passenger arrivals worldwide reached 1,087 million in 2013 and, with transport hubs 
expanding both in passenger volume and number of destinations, it is important to understand 
the role of transportation systems in respiratory virus transmission events to inform public 
health policy [4]. It has been hypothesised that mass transport systems are involved in 
amplifying and accelerating the spread of influenza and coronaviruses globally, due to high 
crowd densities and enclosed spaces, which provide prime conditions for person-to-person 
transmission via inhalation of virus in aerosols and/or droplets [5]. High passenger 
throughput provides enhanced opportunities for indirect transmission via fomite spread.  
 
Transmission events of other respiratory pathogens aboard aircraft (such as Mycobacterium 
tuberculosis complex) have been widely investigated [6]. Knowledge from these incidents 
has contributed to guidelines for the prevention and control of disease transmission [7].  
 
Two literature reviews published prior to the 2009 influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 pandemic 
investigated pathogen transmission aboard aircraft and identified SARS-CoV and influenza 
transmission events [6, 8]. However, these were not systematic enquiries, and no conclusions 
were drawn about the numbers of passengers at risk of secondary infection or whether air 
travel propagates influenza or SARS-CoV transmission. Adlhoch & Leitmeyer (2014) 
reviewed influenza transmission aboard aircraft. Suspected influenza transmission aboard 
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long and short haul flights was identified [9] but, due to limitations within included studies, 
an assessment of the risk of influenza transmission aboard aircraft could not be made. Prior 
reviews have not considered the potential roles of sea and ground mass transport systems or 
hubs, synthesised evidence from mathematical modelling studies; nor attempted to ascertain 
the role of transport systems in accelerating the spread of viruses to new geographical areas. 
 
We attempted to address these gaps when undertaking a systematic review to assess the 
evidence that air, sea and ground mass transport systems or hubs are associated with the 
spread of influenza, SARS-CoV and MERS-CoV between humans. We aimed to identify 
evidence of amplification and/or acceleration of virus transmission related to the use of such 
transport systems. This review was not concerned with the timing of pandemics or the 
effectiveness of specific interventions such as entry and exit screening. 
 
METHODS 
This systematic review was conducted according to Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic 
Reviews and Meta-Analyses (PRISMA) guidelines [10] and the protocol was registered with 
the National Institute for Health Research international prospective register of systematic 
reviews prior to execution of the search strategy [11].  
 
The population of interest was humans using air, sea or ground mass transportation vehicles 
or hubs and exposed to influenza, SARS-CoV or MERS-CoV via the breathed or touched 
environment. Qualitative and quantitative evidence of acceleration and/or amplification of 
pathogen transmission related to the transport systems was gathered. This was to include 
laboratory confirmed and suspected cases, geographically and temporally linked to transport 
vehicle or hub use. No restrictions were placed on study design, language (English abstract 
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required) or date (all studies up to the search date of 18 April 2014 were considered). Studies 
on military personnel and transport were excluded due to differing practices and regulations 
that would increase heterogeneity and limit generalisability. This review was concerned with 
estimating the risk of transmission related to the use of transport systems, not the timing of 
pandemics or the effectiveness of specific interventions. 
  
Search strategy and study selection 
Healthcare databases and sources of grey literature were searched (Appendix S1). Domain 
experts were contacted to request details of studies they regarded relevant to this review. 
Critical keyword and thesaurus heading search constructs were developed for MEDLINE 
(Appendix S2) and adapted for use with other sources [11]. Identified studies were imported 
into EndNote X6 software package (Thomson Reuters, San Francisco, United States of 
America). Following the removal of duplicates all records were screened against the protocol 
eligibility criteria (Appendix S3) by two reviewers sequentially at title, abstract and full text 
stages. Reference and citation tracking was performed on all eligible studies. 
 
Data collection and risk of bias assessments 
A piloted form was used to extract data in duplicate from all included studies. Data items 
extracted were related to study information (location, design, objectives), population details 
(study group, case definitions), exposure details (virus and transport type) and outcome 
(evidence of transmission and use of a comparator). Risk of bias assessments were performed 
on all included studies at study and outcome level using the Newcastle-Ottawa Scale (NOS) 
[12] for observational studies, the US Agency for Healthcare Research Quality tool [13] for 
reviews and a tool previously designed at the University of Nottingham for assessing risk of 
bias in mathematical modelling studies [14]. 
7 
 
Summary measures and synthesis of results 
A range of outcome measures were identified including the number of secondary cases 
aboard transport vehicles, attack rates on transport vehicles and the correlation between 
passenger arrival volumes and the number of days to the peak of virus deaths. 
 
A qualitative approach was used to narratively synthesise results according to the framework 
described by the UK Economic and Social Research Council [15]. The analysis was stratified 
by virus and transport type. The form of data available and presence of substantial 
heterogeneity between studies precluded meta-analysis. 
 
RESULTS 
Study selection and characteristics 
Of the 2,940 studies identified and screened, 41 met the protocol eligibility criteria (Figure 
1). Twenty-seven observational studies (24 retrospective cohort, one case-control, two cross-
sectional), three reviews (two systematic and one literature review), ten modelling studies and 
one qualitative report were included. The studies were undertaken across Europe (UK, 
Germany, Spain), Asia (China, Korea, Japan, Singapore), North America (USA and Canada) 
and Australasia (New Zealand and Australia). Computational fluid dynamics (CFD) were 
used in many of the included modelling studies to simulate the dispersion of pathogens in 
specified environments. 
 
Study characteristics have been tabulated based on organism and transport type (Appendix 
S4). Twenty-nine studies were on influenza five on SARS-CoV and two on MERS-CoV. 
Three did not specify the virus transmitted and two were on both influenza and SARS-CoV. 
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The majority of studies (n=30) investigated transmission related to air transport (Appendix 
S5). There were six studies on sea transport (Appendix S6) and six on ground transport 
(Appendix S7).  
 
Risk of bias 
For observational studies there was a generally high risk of bias (median NOS score 3). Main 
limitations included selection bias, recall bias and an inability to exclude other sources of 
infection (Appendix S8). The overall risk of bias of included modelling studies was moderate 
to low (Appendix S9). Limitations arose from the assumptions that all journeys were 
homogenous and from not considering the potential effects of individuals’ actions during 
transit (e.g. moving around an aircraft cabin). 
 
The two literature reviews [6, 8] had moderate to high risk of bias due to non-systematic 
search strategies and unclear eligibility criteria. The review by Adlhoch & Leitmeyer (2014) 
had a low risk of bias [9] (Appendix S10). 
 
Influenza and air transport 
Laboratory confirmed in-flight transmission was limited on four flights, with only 1-2 
passengers affected [16, 17, 18]. On one flight, four passengers acquired confirmed infection 
and a further six passengers had influenza-like-illness (ILI) fitting the CDC definition [19], 
giving a combined attack rate of 4.3% [20]. Symptomatic passengers aboard were essential 
for in-flight transmission to occur. Higher levels of in-flight transmission have been 
suspected, and attack rates of ILI have been reported at 2.8% [21], 5.3% -13% [22] and 20% 
[23]. An attack rate of laboratory confirmed influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 has been reported at 
4.7% [24]. In these studies other sources of exposure could not be excluded [21-24]. An 
9 
attack rate of 72% was observed on a grounded aircraft with ventilation systems switched off 
in 1979 [25] which the authors considered an anomaly due to the age and outdated ventilation 
systems of the aircraft. A Lagrangian based mathematical modelling study used an aircraft 
cabin mock-up with data on droplet deposition on surfaces and the frequency that people 
touch surfaces and their mucous membranes. The study concluded that the risk of influenza 
transmission from contaminated surfaces was negligible [26]. 
 
Studies using CFD show a theoretical increased risk of transmission if seated in close 
proximity to an index case [26, 27, 28]. Evidence from observational studies is inconclusive. 
Foxwell et al (2011) showed a 1.4% increased risk of ILI if seated within 2 rows of an index 
case [16] and Baker et al (2010) showed a higher attack rate of  ILI (3.5%) within 2 rows of 
an index case compared to that in the rear section of the aircraft (1.9%) [18]. However, 
transmission has also been observed to persons seated in distant locations from an index case 
[17], and two studies calculated no significant association between seating location and risk 
of influenza transmission [20, 21]. In-flight passengers movements would potentially bring 
the index case into contact with non-neighbouring passengers, thus enabling transmission  
 
The risk of in-flight transmission was shown to be theoretically higher on long haul flights [5, 
27]. Long haul flights can be defined based on time, geographic location of the destination 
(the Civil Aviation Authority in the UK states the flights leaving the UK with destinations 
outside of Europe, Russia, Turkey and North Africa are classed as long haul [29]) or flight 
distance (medium haul flights are classed as 2000-5000 kilometres long [30]). Guputa et al 
(2012) used a probabilistic model with data on the exhalation, dispersion and inhalation of 
droplets carrying infectious agents [5] whilst Wagner et al (2009) used a Wells-Riley 
equation [31] and existing data on airflow patterns of cross-Atlantic airliners. Both models 
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appear valid but assume there is one index case who remained static throughout the flight, 
therefore movement and possible contacts are not accounted for. Wagner et al (2009) also 
assumes that the air contamination is uniform [27]. All confirmed cases of transmission from 
observational studies were on long haul flights [16, 17, 18, 20]. On one short haul flight 
secondary transmission to up to 20 passengers was highly suspected but other sources of 
exposure could not be excluded [23]. 
 
Air travel accelerates the importation of community-acquired influenza to new areas. 
Secondary cases have been observed at previously unaffected destinations after contact with 
infectious air passenger arrivals [17, 32]. This has been observed both in conjunction with in-
flight transmission and where no in-flight transmission events occurred. Two studies (one 
European, one North American) have investigated the association between the volume of air 
travel passenger arrivals and the timing of the seasonal peak of influenza deaths [33, 34]. 
Both found a strong, statistically significant negative correlation and concluded that high 
volumes of air travel are associated with introducing influenza to new areas. A significant 
association between air passenger volumes from Mexico and the likelihood of 
A(H1N1)pdm09 importation has also been observed [35]. 
 
Airports theoretically provide opportunities for influenza transmission [36]. Quan et al 
(2013) modelled the potential number of secondary infections caused by infectious airport 
terminal workers. A super-spreader working in arrivals could infect a mean average of 16.7 
people per day and in departures 28.7 people per day [36]. The behaviour of people travelling 
in groups was shown to increase the risk of further transmission. The data sources of this 
model were not clearly specified and model assumptions not mentioned therefore its validity 
and reliability are uncertain. No observational studies were identified in this area. 
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Influenza and sea transport 
Observed outbreaks of influenza-like illness (ILI) on cruise ships have previously affected 
2% - 7% of passengers [37, 38, 39]. Higher proportions of crew (up to 13%) have reported 
ILI [37, 40] although this may include a case ascertainment bias due to active surveillance in 
this group being common. There was limited laboratory confirmation of influenza in ILI 
cases although when undertaken the proportion of confirmed cases were within the 2% - 7% 
range [39, 41]; on one ship simultaneous outbreaks were confirmed of A(H1N1)pdm09 (3% 
of passengers confirmed positive) and A(H3N2) (3.6%  confirmed positive) [39]. 
 
Sea transport was important in accelerating the spread of influenza to new areas in the 1918 
pandemic [42] although no evidence of this occurring more recently was identified. No 
evidence of influenza or coronavirus transmission occurring at sea ports was found. 
 
Influenza and ground transport 
Influenza transmission related to ground transport was only investigated by six quantitative 
studies [43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48]. On one bus journey, transmission to one secondary case was 
laboratory confirmed [43] whereas on a different journey 84% of a group travelling together 
contracted influenza [44]. Transmission was highly suspected on a long distance train, on 
which a large number of secondary cases were observed with one confirmed index case 
aboard. The risk of transmission was associated with seating proximity to the index case and 
duration spent aboard [45]. However, other sources of exposure could not be excluded. 
Modelling studies found that the risk of transmission increases with travel duration and 
seating proximity to index cases [46, 47] Zhu et al (2012) used a CFD based model to 
determine that the risk of influenza transmission to bus passengers could reach 27.2% if 
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seated in the path of the airflow and close to the index case. This assumes passengers do no 
move and doors do not open or close [46]. Furuya (2014) used a Wells-Riley model [31] to 
determine that the mean reproduction number for influenza on a commuter train was >2 and 
the risk of transmission increased linearly with journey duration [47]. 
 
A case-control study by Troko et al (2011) in the UK found that, after adjusting for 
confounders, persons reporting to the GP with acute respiratory infection (ARI) were almost 
six times as likely to have used public transport in the previous five days than controls (odds 
ratio 5.94, p<0.05) [48].  
 
Rail transport was important in accelerating the spread of influenza to new areas in the 1918 
A(H1N1) pandemic [42]. Transmission to persons in previously unaffected destinations from 
arriving rail passengers was observed in China during the A(H1N1)pdm09 pandemic [45]. 
 
SARS-CoV 
High levels of SARS-CoV transmission have previously been suspected on flights. Three 
short haul flights with symptomatic passengers aboard were followed up, 16 passengers 
developed laboratory confirmed SARS-CoV and 6 met the WHO definition of probable 
infection [49, 50]. No significant association to seating proximity to an index case was 
observed and although interviews led to no other obvious sources of exposure they could not 
be excluded [49]. Transmission to an air stewardess was noted on one flight where other 
sources of exposure were deemed unlikely [51]. On six other flights carrying symptomatic 
SARS-CoV cases no secondary cases were identified [51]. Seven flights inbound to the USA 
with symptomatic and pre-symptomatic passengers on board were investigated, four 
passengers reported symptoms, none tested positive for SARS-CoV [52]. No studies 
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investigated SARS-CoV transmission related to sea or ground transport systems or hubs. No 
studies investigated the role of these in accelerating SARS-CoV spread to new areas. 
 
MERS-CoV 
In-flight transmission was modelled to be possible and associated with flight duration and 
quanta per hour of virus exhaled [53]. Whilst no studies have observed this in real-life, 
transmission from an infectious air passenger to contacts at an unaffected destination has 
occurred [54]. No studies were found to investigate MERS-CoV transmission associated with 
sea or ground transport systems or hubs. 
 
DISCUSSION 
 Summary of evidence 
To our knowledge this is the first systematic review of respiratory virus transmission related 
to transport systems to incorporate both modelling and observational studies. Investigating 
the introduction of influenza and coronaviruses to geographically distinct areas via mass 
transport systems provides a more complete understanding of the roles of transport systems 
and what is required to reduce influenza and coronavirus propagation. Sea and ground 
transport are often overlooked in place of air transport but it is important to understand their 
impact on respiratory virus propagation as they are heavily used modes of transport, which 
may play an important role.  
 
The results of our systematic review show that air transport accelerates the importation of 
community-acquired influenza to new areas [17, 32, 33, 34, 35] and that in-flight 
transmission of influenza has occurred on multiple occasions [16, 17, 18] with up to four 
laboratory confirmed secondary cases and an additional six cases of ILI identified per flight 
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[20]. Suspected in-flight transmission of ILI has been reported in up to 20% of passengers 
[23] although other sources of exposure could not be excluded. Influenza transmission in 
airport terminals was investigated by one modelling study, which showed the potential for 
transmission to occur to large numbers of passengers [36]. 
 
We found evidence of ILI outbreaks affecting 2% - 7% of passengers and 13% of crew on 
cruise ships [37, 38] with laboratory testing confirming cases within this range [39]. 
Although historically ships accelerated the spread of influenza to new areas [42] no evidence 
of this occurring in modern day pandemics was identified. 
 
Influenza transmission has occurred aboard buses [43] and been highly suspected aboard 
trains [45]. Trains have accelerated influenza spread to new areas in historic and modern-day 
pandemics [42, 45]. 
 
In-flight SARS-CoV transmission was confirmed to one person from one flight [51]. Sixteen 
laboratory confirmed and four probable cases from three flights were identified, although 
other sources of exposure were deemed unlikely they could not be excluded [49]. A limited 
quantity of evidence on coronavirus transmission related to air, sea and ground transport was 
found. 
 
Limitations 
In many of the 27 observational studies included the risk of bias was high. Selection bias was 
common with many studies noting difficulties in obtaining flight itineraries and contacting 
passengers. Consequently many studies only contacted persons seated in close proximity to 
an index case or required passengers to self-report symptoms to be included. An 
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underestimation of the level of transmission is therefore possible as passengers with mild or 
asymptomatic infections were not recorded.  
 
Difficulties in excluding other sources of infection meant that the roles of transport systems 
could not be confirmed in transmission to secondary cases in many studies so our estimates 
may be somewhat conservative. Many studies could not distinguish whether transmission 
occurred during or prior to the flight. Although transmission of influenza during travel to 
airports and time spent in airport terminals has been suspected, the 1-4 day incubation period 
of influenza means that it is difficult to pinpoint the exact time and location of transmission 
[55].  
 
Numerous sources of bias in the modelling studies were noted and many could not account 
for behaviour aboard the transport vehicle (e.g. moving around an aircraft cabin), which 
limits the ability to generalise model estimates to practical settings. The risk of bias tool used 
for modelling studies is not yet validated therefore these results must be interpreted with 
caution. 
 
A paucity of evidence and high heterogeneity between studies limits the evidence base on the 
role of ground transport in influenza transmission and the roles of all studied modes of 
transport in coronavirus transmission. No analysis of the roles of transport hubs in 
coronavirus transmission or the introduction of coronaviruses to geographically distant areas 
could be undertaken.  
 
No restrictions on the strain of influenza were applied meaning that varying levels of 
infectivity were possible and were not accounted for in the analysis. The majority of studies 
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were on A(H1N1)pdm09 but all cases meeting the WHO, EDCD or CDC [19, 50, 56] 
definitions of ILI were considered for inclusion.  
 
Implications for public health and policy 
It is important to reduce the chance of symptomatic passengers boarding aircraft to avoid in-
flight transmission. This review found evidence that pre-symptomatic passengers aboard 
aircraft do not pose a risk for in-flight transmission but can introduce influenza to new areas 
following disembarkation. It is unfeasible to detect pre-symptomatic passengers and prevent 
them travelling therefore increased awareness of the risk of introducing pathogens to new 
areas and increased information on modes of preventing onward transmission (e.g. good 
coughing and sneezing etiquette, self-isolation when symptomatic) could reduce the number 
of secondary cases at the distant loci who are epidemiologically linked to travellers. This 
should be considered for long-distance rail passengers in addition to air passengers. 
 
The risk of transmission is theoretically highest in air passengers seated close to an index 
case [26, 27, 28] and increases with flight duration [5, 27]. As the models used do not 
account for the movement of passengers through the aircraft cabin there is still an 
unquantifiable potential risk of transmission to passengers seated further away. A CFD 
modelling study has shown how movement through the cabin can increase the distance a viral 
plume can travel [57] and when transmission has occurred there is not uniform statistically 
significant association between risk and seating proximity to a case. Based on these findings 
contact tracing may focus on, but should not be restricted to persons seated within close 
proximity to an index case. This is in line with recent guidance from ECDC which states that 
complete contact tracing of all passengers and crew is preferable but if not possible then 
passengers seated two seats in all directions and all crew members should be prioritised [9]. 
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Although all confirmed cases of transmission have occurred on long haul flights, 
transmission has also been suspected on short haul flights but cannot be confirmed due to the 
inability to exclude other sources of exposures [21, 23]. Short haul flights are significantly 
shorter than the 1-4 day influenza incubation period [58] therefore a high number of other 
possible exposures can be expected. Based on this, control measures may focus on long haul 
flights but transmission occurring on short haul flights cannot be disregarded and might even 
be greater overall because of the greater number of shorter flights. 
 
Further research 
The possibility that contagious airport workers can infect large numbers of people with 
influenza has been identified [36]. This is an area which requires further research, if this 
model is valid then addressing the issues and actively screening for ILI in airport workers 
could potentially reduce the numbers of secondary cases travelling and spreading influenza 
via air transport. 
 
Further primary research on the roles of ground transport is required. Although the small 
number of studies meant that conclusions could not be drawn, we did identify cases where 
influenza transmission has occurred on buses and is thought to have occurred on trains. 
Further research could determine the risk of transmission and lead to an understanding of 
whether control measures on ground transport systems/hubs are required to reduced influenza 
and coronavirus propagation. 
 
CONCLUSION 
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Our systematic review concludes that transmission of influenza occurs aboard aircraft with up 
to four secondary cases confirmed per affected flight with no other sources of exposure. 
Attack rates of up to 20% have been suspected on flights but this cannot be confirmed due to 
difficulties in excluding other sources of exposure. Air transport plays an important role in 
accelerating the spread of influenza to geographical distinct areas. It is possible that airports 
pose a high risk of transmission and this aspect requires further investigation. Influenza 
outbreaks aboard ships affect significant proportions of passengers and crew but no evidence 
was found of sea transport accelerating influenza or coronavirus spread to new areas in the 
modern era. 
 
Influenza transmission has been observed on ground transport but further primary research is 
required to quantify the risks. Trains have been shown to introduce influenza to new areas but 
additional studies are required to quantify the level of risk. In-flight SARS-CoV transmission 
has been observed as has transmission of MERS-CoV on arrival at uninfected destinations 
but further research is required to estimate the risk of coronavirus infection related to the use 
of air, ground and sea transport systems and hubs.  
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Figure legends 
Figure 1: PRISMA diagram (screening and eligibility) 
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